

The Sociology of Human Rights with Reference to Customary Practice in Rural Pakistan: The Social Structure of Violence

Abstract

This paper deals with the sociology of human rights, particularly with reference to customary practices that exist in areas outside of the cities. We took the example of the 'exchange marriage' in rural Pakistan: the actors involved in the system of exchange and their interpretations of human rights within the structure itself and the existing social conditions of the society. Also, this paper highlights the mechanism of violence that is associated with these customary practices and the fabric of the vicious cycle of this violence. State-of-the-art field investigation on the exchange-marriage system reveals that it does not exist only in Pakistan, but that it has also been exercised on every continent of the world. With the advent of industrialization and individualization, this custom changed rapidly in the West. However, the system still prevails in many developing countries because of set social structures and a deep-rooted moral economy. Human rights activists in the world have not seriously taken into account the moral economy that is attached to such practices, mainly because of the cultural manifestation of the issue.

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The customary practices that shaped the structure and 'culture' of violence in Pakistan still remain strongly manifested in the society.

Introduction and Research Approach

Customary practices are the ways and rules that regulate social life in a society. These include (but are not limited to) family relations, marriage and the dissolution of marriage (in some instances, genital mutilation is also included). In this paper, the term 'customary practices' refer to exchange marriages, child marriages (Amnesty International Report, 2004), forced marriages and *vani/sawara* (compensation marriage). The focus of the debate in this article will be on the exchange-marriage system in Pakistan. In almost every society, customary practices are rated as functional in nature unless they remain in the interest of the society at large. Customs are in transition in many developed countries, but they remain relatively stagnant in developing societies. Since developed societies evaluate their customs by basing them on scientific parameters, they can choose to abandon archaic ones and/or adopt emerging customs. However, developing societies strongly depend upon traditional behaviour, which remains strictly bound to the customs.

This paper highlights the institution of *exchange marriages* (spouse selection on the basis of sister/daughter exchange for marriage) as an example of a customary practice. The custom of the exchange marriage is centuries old and is perhaps the oldest method and most civilized way to get married in primitive societies (Urlin, 1969; Molloy, 1986; Sabeen and Matheiu, 2007). Marriage by 'capture' and marriage by 'fight' were replaced by the exchange-marriage system. This then led to the marriage by 'price' and the 'arranged marriage by wealth' and then arranged marriage on the basis of a dowry. This system of marriage was common and still exists in some pockets among most continents. (see Mauss, 1954; Levi- Strauss, 1969; Bell, 1998; Milicic, 1998; Bollig, 1998). Aboriginal Australian (Bearman, 1997; Muller, 1980; Strathern, 1984), North and Latin American societies and a few parts of Europe (Molho, 1994; Heady, 2001; 2003) follow this system. In Africa, this system was replaced with the bride price and marriage by wealth. Asia (Tapper, 1991; 1989; 1993; Douglas and Schweizer, 1998; Dietrich, 1998), some rural parts of China (Cooper, 1983; 1993), India (Pfeffer, 1983) and Pakistan also follow these traditions. Societies in the Middle East as well as Algeria, Yemen, Palestine and other Middle-Eastern countries also follow this customary practice, as well as that of 'bride price' and 'bride wealth'. Interestingly, no part of the study revealed any

human rights violations: domestic violence, forced marriage or child marriage resulting from the system of exchange anywhere in the world except in South Asia (Dauer, 2002).

In Pakistan, this exchange system seems to be predominant in rural areas (Jacoby and Mansuri, 2008) and among some families in metropolitan cities. South Punjab, interior Sindh, Baluchistan and some parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkawah (KPK) carry out exchange marriages. However, 'bride price' and *vani/sawara* (compensation marriage) are more common in parts of KPK, Baluchistan and Sindh as compared to the province of Punjab. Niaz (2004) and the study done by Bullock, Clive and Khalid (1995) highlighted the health and mental problems in Pakistan that result from the system of exchange marriage. The study revealed medical and psychological disorders among women. However, Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) argued that the exchange marriage protects women's rights and is in the interest of the woman involved. Interestingly, they neglected the issues of personal choice, forced marriages, child marriages and domestic violence, all of which are associated with the system of exchange. On the other hand, some observations on the issue reveal serious human rights violations resulting from the system of exchange (Jilani and Ahmed, 2004 pp.75; Siddiqui, 2000; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 1996 pp.127).

Our emphasis in this paper remains on the debate of the sociology of human rights (how an actor perceives human rights) with reference to customary practices and whether an actor who follows the exchange-marriage custom is a conformist or non-conformist to human rights. Similarly, we highlight some aspects of the customary practices (especially exchange marriages in Pakistan) which promote conflict and then violence and explain how they create a 'culture' of violence.

Research Method

I conducted my fieldwork in the town of Kabirwala (southern Punjab, Pakistan) during 2005 for a six-month period, for two months in 2006 and again, in 2007-2008, to verify the findings, as part of my PhD studies. The Grounded Theory Method (GTM) was adopted for data collection and analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1965; Strauss, 1987; Glaser, 1992; Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Neumann, 1997; Creswell, 2003; Larossa, 2005). A theoretical sampling as per the GTM's guidelines (Glaser, 1992) was followed. Since gender segregation, carried out generally in Pakistan and particularly in rural areas, is an important custom in Pakistan, the

research team conformed to this norm. As such, a female colleague (Abida Sharif) was requested to assist in collecting the data from the female respondents. Otherwise, the data would have remained without gender sensitization. The research team obtained consent from the respondents while explaining the research objectives. Many of the respondents were willing to give interviews. However, two female respondents declined the request and were not willing to give interviews. Twenty-four case histories, based on fifty individuals (the couple, their parents and marriage-age children) were conducted in order to obtain individual perspectives. The research team also engaged in eight focus-group discussions comprised of persons of different ages, genders and generations to glean an in-depth knowledge of the issue. We also collected data from representatives of four non-government organizations (NGOs) who were working on human rights issues as well as lawyers dealing with cases of exchange marriage and four religious scholars. We compiled open, selective and axial coding in order to define the concept, themes and sequence of the themes.

Findings

As indicated above, this article focuses mainly on the exchange-marriage custom. Therefore, we intend to share our findings based on this custom. We focus on three brief case histories derived from the data in order to highlight the human rights problems that result from the system of the exchange marriage. The first case history reflects a simple exchange based on the “generalized exchange” as Bearman (1997) found to be practised among the aboriginal Australians. This reciprocity is also similar to Shalin’s (1972) “positive and balanced” reciprocity. The second case history is close to Shalin’s (1972) notion of “negative reciprocity whereas the third case history that is presented does not fall into any theoretical model or instance of empirical evidence in the existing literature. This is a unique finding which may be termed as a human rights violation due to the system of the exchange marriage.

The following is a brief description of these three case histories.

Case History No. 1

Riaz (a male) and Nawaz (another male) were parallel cousins and both had sisters with *watta satta* (exchange marriage) engagement from childhood, soon after their births. After they finished their secondary school education, their parents decided that their children should get married. Later, Nawaz opened a commercial store in a

local town, while Riaz was without a job. Nawaz offered to open another store for him with his savings and then both were sufficiently earning. Consequently, Riaz gave his share of land to Nawaz's brother so that he could also earn sufficiently. However, their sisters, who were exchanged, quarrelled with each other, which created problems for them. The parents of both couples have tried to settle their issues. Otherwise, both couples do not have any major problems apart from the quarrelling between the two women each of whom was married on the basis of exchange.

Case No. 2

Alim and Qadeer were close friends and maternal cousins. Qadeer and his mother were interested in his marrying Alim's sister (Nasim) in exchange for Qadeer's sister (Najma). Alim was not interested in this marriage and refused this offer, however his uncles and aunts forced him and his family to marry on the basis of exchange; Alim had to accept the marriage. After the marriage, problems started between the two families. Qadeer beat Nasim when she did not cook the lunch on time. As a result, Alim was forced to reciprocate with Najma. Consequently, the bond of friendship was broken. This started a series of conflicting and violent events which led to the dissolution of the marriage for each of the couples after only two years of marriage.

Case No. 3

Alia (a female) and Naeem (a male) were paternal cousins and their parents were in dispute with each other due to land-ownership issues. Both of them had exchanged engagements from childhood with different cousins whom they did not like. Both Alia and Naeem gained admission to attend a university in Multan and they lived there in a hostel. They fell in love with each other and secretly got married in Multan. When Alia's parents found out about their marriage, they became angry because the couple violated the exchange-marriage norm and they proceeded to kill their own daughter. They also tried to attack Naeem but he managed to escape. Now, both families have been quarrelling for years and revenge-taking constantly occurs between them. Alia's family (brothers) have been searching for Naeem in order to take revenge for their sister's marriage to him; Naeem still remains in hiding ever since the killing of his wife.

Watta Satta (exchange marriage): Triplicate Ties

Literally, the word *watta satta* means “to throw a stone/give a gift and return it with the same (or with more) force. It means that if someone gives something to someone else, this is reciprocated with the same zeal (as indicated in Case No. 1 above where Riaz and Nawaz reciprocated with each other). However, if someone hurts someone else, he receives the same response or a worse response from the second party. In Case No. 2, Alim and Qadeer reciprocated negatively with each other. As per the rule of the ‘game’, both had no other option but to carry out a negative reciprocity. Sahlin (1972) also found negative reciprocity in agrarian societies where they follow similar rules related to the exchange system.

Exchange marriages in South Punjab have similar meanings and have both a positive or negative connotation, which may lead to revenge. If a family gives a daughter/sister to the other family (among cousins only), the second family reciprocates immediately or may make a commitment to reciprocate a female as soon as they have a daughter/sister for this. However, this is limited only to cousins and intermarriages with other castes or clans are virtually impossible.

Thus, the *watta satta* has triplicate ties within or among the immediate families. We will explain these three, triplicated social ties of the spouse involved in the exchange marriage and the dichotomy of these social ties within the system of the exchange.

Spouses’ Relationships With the Family of Procreation: Loyalty and Love

The marriages of ‘exchanged couples’ and ‘arranged couples’ are marked by loyalty. A husband/wife has to show loyalty and love to his/her family of procreation. Deviation from this custom brings negative reciprocity to the person (see Sahlin 1972), whereas the conforming actor is always appreciated and receives support from the relatives. However, non-conforming actors are rejected, banned and sometimes even victims of violence. The relatives and community label the deviant person as a “*na ferman*” (non-conformist). Therefore, a person consciously spends most of his life showing loyalty and love towards the family of procreation or the family of orientation.

Spouses’ Relationships With the Family of Orientation: Loyalty, Fairness and Clashes

The family of orientation expects their son/daughter-in-law to show loyalty and respect to his/her in-laws. This family has high expectations because they have

invested (in the form of a family member) in a person who will have to reciprocate one way or another to the family of orientation. This person must be loyal and fair to his/her family of orientation. If this turns out not to be the case, then the family of orientation will ask their own son/daughter (who has been exchanged in the marriage) to be disloyal to their family of orientation. Understandably, this custom generates conflict.

Intimate Relationships: *Sharam* (shame)

Intimate relationships between spouses are always kept unseen. They remain strictly private and are never on show as is the case in Western societies. Contrary to the West, where loyalty between spouses counts more than that shown to the family of orientation or even the family of procreation, the spouses are always dependent upon their respective families in Pakistan. To exhibit or 'show off' the love between the spouses is considered to be "*besharam*" (shame) and has negative values attached to it in rural areas of the country. Loyalty to the family of procreation counts more than that for the family of orientation or the relationship with the spouse. Again, non-conformity to these social values leads to serious conflict and violence among families.

The Normative Structure: The Generation of the Seeds of Conflict

Relationships between the spouses and families involved in the exchange marriage (either material or non-material) as well as between the two families do not always function well. Any mistake, though at times minor, causes disputes in one couple, affecting the second couple with immediate effect as a result of this normative structure. The conflict/disagreement between the couples or their respective families shapes the conflict and may lead to a division among close relatives and the clan at large. Therefore, the families of both spouses will try their best to settle the conflict at the domestic level (see also Versa-Sanso 1999 and Razzak and Durocher 2005). However, these conflicts are always open to violence and, consequently, become a matter that amounts to a violation of human rights.

Conflicts in the System of Exchange Marriage: Human Rights Violations

Violations of human rights are common within the exchange-marriage system (similarly as in other customary practices). In Case No. 3 (presented above) Alia and Naeem had to face the problems which are closed to the notion of human rights violation. Conflict between the couple often leads to verbal, symbolic, economic and

physical violence. This violence is not only limited to the female, as males are also victims of this tradition. Additionally, child marriages, forced marriages and domestic violence are common within the system of exchange marriages. From my data, I found that both genders were the victims of violence as indicated by one of the female respondents who informed: “Look! My husband punished me last month and my brother, in revenge for me, punished not only his wife, but he wounded my husband, too. Whenever there is fight between us (husband and wife), it has serious effects on my brother, his wife and my *susrali* (family-in-law)”. A lawyer told me: “Both families retain the right to fight each other with available resources. They abuse, hurt each other and try to damage their property when they are in conflict with each other.”

A male respondent, when asked whether he keeps in mind that they are violating human rights, replied: “What do you mean by human rights?...If someone abuses, beats or hurts us, is it not our right to protect ourselves?...We protect only our family (brother/ sister) which is our prime responsibility”. Kalim, another male respondent reported: “human rights have nothing to do with our family affairs. It is not our practice; we do not know about human rights stuff...” When asked what human rights are, Asif (a male) replied: “No, I do not know and neither do I need to know about them. This is not related to our familial affairs”. Another respondent, Sajida, who was educated, explained: “Nobody knows any humanity or human values while fighting....The notion of human rights becomes irrelevant when things are becoming complicated with familial affairs”. Similarly, a male respondent reported: “If my sister, who is exchanged is the victim of violence, then why should I not take revenge?” Violence is a deep-rooted manifestation and part of the social structure of the society. Violent, revenge-taking behaviour has become part of the latent behaviour of the community, so much so that the community is unable to identify the violence.

Forced /Child Marriages: Domestic Violence

Upon examining the data, it became clear that domestic violence, abuse and physical violence, are all part and parcel of the exchange-marriage system. Forced/child marriages are specifically important in light of the violence in the system of exchange. For instance, Saleem, a male respondent elaborated: “My sister had not agreed to marry our cousin, my father slept and forced her to keep silent and follow the instructions to get married. She was engaged from her childhood and she is

married now on the basis of *watta satta* and has three children.” He further explained: “I was not interested in marrying my cousin, but my father forced me to marry her. Now, I am living with a forced marriage....Although my wife and I do not have a good relationship with each other, we still have to live together because it was the decision of my father”. A male respondent, Mehboob, reported: “Parents are the right persons to decide about the “*rishta*” (spouse selection) because they are more experienced and they know what is good and not good for their children.”

Domestic violence resulting from this customary practice is perceived as a justified act of the parents or spouses. Furthermore, the frequency of violence is deeply penetrated in the structure of the society. Nonetheless, the offending actor involved in the exchange marriage hardly sees this practice of violence as a violation of human rights.

Exchange Marriage and ‘Tit For Tat’: The Chain Reaction of Violence

The term “exchange marriage” refers to equal reciprocity: either with positive or negative return. The negative reciprocity generates a chain reaction of conflict which leads to violence in Pakistan. Contrary to Jacoby and Ghazala’s (2008) findings, my data revealed that, due to this kind of marriage, the system contains more negative reciprocity as compared to positive reciprocity. For instance, Akbar had a difficult relationship with his wife (Sadan) and they fought with each other on minor domestic issues. As a result, the brother of Sadan, Saghir, fought with his wife (Namu) to take revenge for his sister. This violence did not stop at this point; the brother of the first couple took sides and the mother of Saghir took sides with her son. Consequently, all close relatives started taking sides with either party and a never-ending chain reaction of violence began. Akbar beat his wife (Sadan) and in revenge, Saghir beat his wife (Namu) who is the sister of Akbar. Close relatives tried their best to resolve the conflict by forcing both parties to stop the violence, as they knew that this conflict could reach them. Owing to the intervention of elders (grandparents), this came to an end after six months. Though such a particular conflict may end, it can still generate another wave of violence in the future.

Exchange marriages are often seen as a chain reaction of violence and a source of never-ending violence (Zaman 2011). This type of violence is different from one region to another. However, the notion of reciprocity (give and take) remains constant. There is hardly a stage of equal giving and taking that does not lead to conflict and then violence in customary practices.

Customs: Social Networking

As mentioned above, exchange marriages do not always cause problems, but have strong reasons to persist. The system of exchange marriage creates an alliance (in Levi-Strauss's 1969 notion), and mutual welfare (Jacoby and Ghazala 2008). It forms a social network where all cousins and relatives are woven in a single web of relationships. They are the "*shreek*" (shareholder/ relative or party) of the positive as well as the negative results of the relationship. These cousins remain closely attached to each other through such marriages. The system of the exchange inherits security (Zaman 2008).

A male respondent reported:

"We marry among our cousins because we maintain our close relationships with each other. This creates security and maintains the purity of our blood relations. Otherwise, if we have to marry out of the clan or caste, then people will give us "*tanay*" (abuse) because we are not *khandani* (pure family). This may lead to a segregation of our close relatives... We will become weak and others (enemies) can easily hurt us... We cannot allow others to attack us due to our weakness."

Keeping in view the above-highlighted fact that exchange marriages include a strong notion of alliance formation, mutual welfare, social security and insecurity, the system also strengthens social networking. Such social networking brings some positive rewards to the clans and families involved.

Exchange Marriages and Tradition: Social Exchange and a Moral Economy

Customary practices (especially exchange marriages) in rural Pakistan have a strong notion of 'moral economy'. The actors are knitted into the network and remain obliged to follow strict moral values upon marrying close relatives on the basis of exchange. If anyone violates this norm, the other community members will make them conform. An actor always keeps in mind: "*Log kia kahain gai!* (What will people say?!)." The research team met a medical doctor during my fieldwork. He was married to his cousin on the basis of exchange. We asked him about his education in the medical field and the fact that marriages between cousins are more genetically problematic as compared to non-cousin marriages. Moreover, exchange marriages create difficulties but he is still married to his cousin on the basis of exchange. He replied in this way:

“Look! I know all of these facts, but you know our family values are strict. If I had not married my cousin, my sister (who was exchanged since her childhood) would not have married her cousin either. She would become a ‘victim’ of my education and she would be treated as a stigmatized lady. No one else from my family would have taken her *rishta* and my parents would not have married her to anyone else. I just tried to save my sister’s life...If I had not married my cousin, then people would have been skeptical about giving education to their children by thinking that, after education, the children become *nafarman* (deviant).”

The moral economy prevails strongly in the rural areas of Pakistan and it is deeply rooted within the social structure of the community. People feel comfortable with keeping this moral economy and they follow shared values.

Theoretical Interpretation

Social scientists, (especially advocates of structuralist and functionalist paradigms), working on the field analyses of such customary practices on the basis of subjective interruptions have tried to find some logic to these customs. Levi-Strauss is a prominent structuralist who found that the exchange marriage is a system of social exchange and that the marriages are like grammatical rules that change as per the need of any given society. However, the conflict paradigm criticizes the custom’s functional perspective. They are advocates of humanist values (ideally speaking). This paradigm is popular with the human rights activists in their perspective of the system of exchange.

Taking rationality into account, the ‘interactionism’ paradigm places more emphasis upon the working nature of the customs within the given social conditions of those particular customs. Bourdieu (1984) found that exchange marriages include a mechanism of violence exchange. In his view, this kind of violence, which is the result of customary practices, is accepted and perceived as ‘legitimate’ violence.

Two forces are working in parallel in the system of exchange: the exchange mechanism and the moral economy of the exchange-marriage system (Thompson, 1971; 1993; Lindholm, 1982; 1988 and Archer, 1996). The system is based on exchange: give and take. This ‘give and take’ is not limited to material things, but rather it is an exchange of values. The exchange mechanism includes the women themselves who have been exchanged for marriage, gift exchange, welfare and security. Non-material exchange is the exchange of appreciation, honour (Hussain,

2005), respect, social networking and conformity within the values system. This exchange has negative connotations as well: mutual threat, deterrence and social insecurity.

Consequently, material and non-material exchange form a 'moral economy'. This moral economy is based on mutual reciprocity, obligation, trust and alliance formation, social support and respect/honour of the value system. If one does not conform to this morality, it leads to a serious moral vacuum and consequently to moral decay. However, if there are ways to overcome and restructure the moral economy, then there is space to bring transformation and social change to the system of exchange marriages. Nevertheless, the option of initiating social transformation depends upon resources being available and opportunities presenting themselves within the structure of the exchange system.

Discussion and Conclusion

Customary practices prevail strongly as demonstrated in the above data. I will now give a comparative view of customary practices both in the developed and developing world.

Customary Practices in the Developed World: Flexibility in Transition

The developed world is able to restructure its behaviour on the basis of rationality. The actor is socialised in such a way that he/she remains open to transition and social change. The West developed a new morality along with the development of industrialization. Western societies opened new notions of human values and individualization alongside scientific development. Thus, the West came to the conclusion that an exchange marriage is problematic. It gradually abandoned this type of marriage and transformed it into the "autonomous" marriage. Love, affiliation, monetary interest and physical attraction count more in the Western marriage system as compared to arranged or exchanged marriages. This has led to the formulation of a moral economy of human rights, individual rights and the right to exercise one's choice. Thus, the developed world is flexible to social change, which is paradoxically contrasted with developing countries where social change is viewed as an alien value and people remain ambivalent (at best) to this value.

Customary Practices in Developing Countries: The Conservation Approach

Contrary to the developed world, developing societies remain close to tradition and follow customary practices. For instance, Meek (1936) wanted to keep the then-dying system of the exchange marriage alive and see it exist as a useful value in Africa. Developing countries are conscious of following traditional values and try their best to conserve them. Exchange marriages still prevail in India (Böck 1998, Böck and Rao 2000, Kapila 2004), Pakistan (Niaz 2004, Jacoby and Mansuri 2008), Algeria (Bourdieu 1984, 1998), Yemen, Palestine, Israel and aboriginal communities in Latin America, North America and Australia as a result of the conservation of approach taken to customary practices (Molloy 1986). Customary practices are observed as being carried out in different parts of the developing world and among aboriginal communities. This approach has led to a stagnant social structure (Merton 1941, 1968) and fabric of society. Although there are many human rights violations within the system of exchange marriages, still they prevail in developing countries.

Customs in Pakistan: Symbolism and the ‘Culture’ of Violence

Pakistan is a special case when speaking of customary practices (keeping in view the case of exchange marriages). It has a symbolic ‘culture’ attached to its customary practices. For instance, the purity of blood is viewed as important. To marry among cousins is important in terms of symbolic values. The perception of “What will people say?” if someone marries outside the family/clan/caste is a vitally important and influential notion. Similarly, in developing countries, a person must maintain the symbolic values: respect, honour and minimal shame within the marriage system, at any cost (Zaman 2009). Owing to these symbolic values, customary practices have strong roots in the society.

In Pakistan, the system has formed a ‘culture’ of violence resulting from the customary practices. The actors are socialized in such a way that they accept the violence and reciprocate it to others. As the state is unable to perceive and/or understand this structure and culture of violence, it (the violence) has penetrated the society and has become an important aspect of the normative structure and culture of Pakistani society.

Customs and Human Rights: The Structure of Violence

Customary practices (such as exchange marriages) involve serious human rights violations. These customs form a social structure of violence from which no one can

escape. Forced and child marriages are an example of this violence. Bourdieu (1998:192) rightly observed that “legitimate violence” prevails as a result of the system of exchange marriages.

[Such relationships] “are interchangeable ways of performing the same function, with the “choice” between overt violence and gentle, hidden violence depending on the relative strengths of the two parties at a particular time, and on the degree of integration and ethical integrity of the arbitrating group....symbolic violence, the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety – in short, all of the virtues honoured by the code of honour – cannot fail to be seen as the most Economic mode of domination, i.e. the mode which best corresponds to the economy of the system.”

In a nutshell, human rights activists have to think about how the social structure of violence, which is the result of customary practices that have penetrated into the normative structure of the society, can be transformed. Customs can be channelized in such a way as to reduce the occurrence of human rights violations. So far, the activists have been able to change the developed world’s moral values. However, they are unable to transform the customary practices in the developing countries (like Pakistan), mainly because they do not understand the grounded reality and are unable to change the moral economy of these societies. They have to understand what the mechanisms of the customary practices in the developing countries are and how these could be transformed to reduce human rights violations, or to eliminate them completely, which seems to be virtually impossible.

Customary practices, in some cases, are important sources for the creation and formation of a social structure and culture that is prone to accept violence. Individual emancipation seems to be an important step towards the protection of individual as well as collective rights. Human rights can be protected along with an understanding of the grounded reality of the developing world. Since, grounding realities do not shape another direction, the protection of human rights will be a question in the developing countries. Nonetheless, the future research on spousal relations, changing family patterns and debate of the individual emancipation still is needed.

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